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Abstract
We consider a group of (multi)-integrator agents playing games on a network, in a partial-decision information scenario. We
design fully distributed continuous-time controllers, based on consensus and primal-dual gradient dynamics, to drive the agents
to a generalized Nash equilibrium. Our first solution adopts fixed gains, whose choice requires the knowledge of some global
parameters of the game. Therefore, to adapt the procedure to setups where the agents do not have any global information, we
introduce a controller that can be tuned in a completely decentralized fashion, thanks to the use of integral adaptive weights.
We further introduce algorithms, both with constant and dynamic gains, specifically devised for generalized aggregative games.
For all the proposed control schemes, we show convergence to a variational equilibrium, under Lipschitz continuity and strong
monotonicity of the game mapping, by leveraging monotonicity properties and stability theory for projected dynamical systems.
1 Introduction
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems arise
in several engineering applications, including demand-
side management in the smart grid [25], charg-
ing/discharging of electric vehicles [18], formation con-
trol [21], communication networks [14]. In these exam-
ples, multiple selfish decision makers, or agents, aim
at optimizing their individual, yet inter-dependent, ob-
jective functions, subject to shared constraints. From
a game-theoretic perspective, the goal is to design dis-
tributed GNE seeking algorithms, using the local infor-
mation available to each agent. Moreover, in the cyber-
physical sytems framework, games are often played by
agents with their own dynamics [24], [28]. In this case,
the “strategy” of each agent consists of the output of a
dynamical system, and controllers have to be conceived
to steer the physical processes to a Nash equilibrium,
while ensuring closed-loop stability. Therefore, it is ad-
vantageous to consider continuous-time schemes, for
which control-theoretic properties are more easily un-
raveled.
Literature review: A variety of different algorithms
have been proposed to seek GNE in a distributed way
[32], [33], [6]. A recent part of the literature focuses
on aggregative games, for which the cost of each agent
depends on the others agents’ strategy only via an ag-
gregative function [2], [4], [7]. These works refers to
(aggregative) games played in a full-information setting,
where each agent can access the decision of all the com-
petitors (aggregate value), for example in the presence
of a central coordinator that broadcasts the data to the
network. Nevertheless, in many applications, the exis-
tence of a node with bidirectional communication with
all the agents may be impractical, and the agents can
only rely on local information. One solution is offered by
pay-off based methods [15], [28], that are decentralized,
but require the agents to measure their cost functions.
Alternatively, in this paper, we assume that the agents
agree on sharing some information with their neighbors.
Each agent keeps an estimate of all the competitors’
action and asymptotically reconstruct the true value,
exploiting the data exchanged over the network. Such a
partial-decision information scenario has been investi-
gated for games without coupling constraints, resorting
to (projected) gradient and consensus dynamics, both
in discrete-time [26], [20], and continuous-time [17], [30],
[8]. Of major interest for this paper is the method in [8],
where a nonlinear averaging integral controller is used
to tune on-line the weights of the communication. The
advantage is to guarantee convergence to a Nash equi-
librium (NE) without requiring the knowledge of any
global parameter or the use of a constant, high-enough,
gain, which is the solution proposed in [17]. Fewer works
deal with generalized games. A double-layer algorithm
was presented in [31]. Remarkably, Pavel in [23] de-
rived a single-timescale, fixed step-size GNE learning
algorithm, by leveraging an elegant operator splitting
approach. The authors of [11] addressed aggregative
games with equality constraints, via continuous-time de-
sign. Moreover, all the results mentioned above consider
static or single-integrator agents only. Distributively
driving a network of more complex physical systems to
game theoretic solutions is still a relatively unexplored
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problem. With regard to aggregative games, a propor-
tional integral feedback algorithm was developed in [9]
to seek a NE in networks of passive nonlinear second-
order systems; in [10], [34], continuous-time gradient-
based controllers were introduced for some classes of
nonlinear dynamics with uncertainties. The authors of
[28] addressed generally coupled cost games played by
linear agents, via an extremum seeking approach. NE
problems arising in systems of multi-integrator agents
were studied in [24]. Moreover, all the references cited
do not consider generalized games. Despite the scarcity
of results, the presence of coupling constraints is a sig-
nificant extension, that arises naturally in a variety of
fields, when the agents share some common resource or
limitation [12, 2].
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this paper
we investigate continuous-time GNE seeking for net-
works of multi-integrator agents. We consider games
with affine coupling constraints, played under partial-
decision information. Specifically:
• We introduce two primal-dual projected-gradient con-
trollers, for the case of single-integrator agents. The
first is a continuous-time version of the algorithm in
[23]. It employs a constant gain, whose choice requires
the knowledge of the algebraic connectivity of the
communication graph and of the Lipschitz and strong
monotonicity constants of the game mapping. To re-
lax this condition, we present a novel distributed av-
eraging integral controller, that extends the solution
of [8] to generalized games. In particular, the adap-
tive weights in place of the fixed global gain allows for
a fully-decentralized tuning, that does not need any
non-local information. For both algorithms, we prove
convergence of primal and dual variables, under strong
monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game
mapping. We are not aware of any other continuous-
time GNE seeking scheme, for generally coupled costs
games, whose convergence is guaranteed under such
mild assumptions. (3)
• We propose a controller, with dynamic gains, specifi-
cally designed for generalized aggregative games. The
agents keep and exchange an estimate of the aggregate
value only, thus reducing communication and compu-
tation cost. With respect to [11], we can also handle
inequality constraints. Furthermore, our algorithm re-
quires no knowledge of global parameters and virtu-
ally no tuning. (4)
• We show how all of our controllers can be adapted to
learning GNE in games with shared constraints played
by multi-integrator agents. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to address generalized games
with higher-order dynamical agents. Besides, the use
of adaptive weights still ensures convergence without
any a priori information on the game. (5)
Some preliminary results of this paper have been sub-
mitted in [5], where algorithms with adaptive gains and
aggregative games are not considered.
Basic notation: R (R≥0) denotes the set of (nonnegative)
real numbers. For a differentiable function g : Rn → R,
∇xg(x) is its gradient. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector
with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we
may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as sub-
script. In ∈ Rn×n denotes the identity matrix of dimen-
sion n. A> and ‖A‖ denote the transpose and the largest
singular value of a matrix A, respectively. If A is sym-
metric, λmin(A) := λ1(A) ≤ · · · ≤ λn(A) =: λmax(A)
denote its eigenvalues. A  0 stands for a symmet-
ric positive definite matrix. diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes
the block diagonal matrix with the matrices A1, . . . , AN
on its diagonal. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker prod-
uct of the matrices A and B. For x, y ∈ Rn, let x>y
and ‖x‖ denote the Euclidean inner product and norm,
respectively. Given N vectors y1, . . . , yN , we may de-
note y := col (y1, . . . , yN ) = [y
>
1 . . . y
>
N ]
>, and, for each
i = 1, . . . , N , y−i := col (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yN ).
Operator-theoretic definitions: A mapping F : Rn → Rn
is monotone (µ-strongly monotone, with µ > 0) if, for all
x, y ∈ Rn, (F (x)−F (y))>(x− y) ≥ 0 (≥ µ‖x− y‖2). A
mapping F : Rm → Rn is θ-Lipschitz continuous, with
θ > 0, if, for all x, y ∈ Rm, ‖F (x) − F (y)‖ ≤ θ‖x − y‖.
E denotes the closure of a set E. Given a closed convex
set S ⊆ Rn, the mapping projS : Rn → S denotes the
projection onto S , i.e., projS(v) := argminy∈S ‖y − v‖.
The set-valued mapping NS : Rn ⇒ Rn denotes the nor-
mal cone operator for the the set S, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if
x /∈ S, {v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v>(z − x) ≤ 0} otherwise. The
tangent cone operator of S is defined as TS : Rn ⇒ Rn,
TS(x) =
⋃
δ>0
1
δ (S − x). ΠS(x, v) := projTS(x)(v) de-
notes the projection on the tangent cone of S at x.
By Moreau’s Decomposition Theorem [1, Th. 6.30],
it holds that v = projTS(x)(v) + projNS(x)(v) and
projTS(x)(v)
>projNS(x)(v) = 0, for any v ∈ Rn.
Lemma 1 For any nonempty closed convex set S ⊆ Rq,
any y, y′ ∈ S and any ξ ∈ Rq, it holds that
(y − y′)>ΠS (y, ξ) ≤ (y − y′)>ξ.
Thus, if ΠS(y, ξ) = 0, then (y − y′)>ξ ≥ 0. 
Proof. By Moreau’s theorem, (ξ −ΠC(y, ξ)) ∈ NS(y),
hence for any y, y′ ∈ C, (y′ − y)>(ξ −ΠC(y, ξ)) ≤ 0. 
2 Mathematical Background
We consider a group of noncooperative agents I :=
{1, . . . , N}, where each agent i ∈ I shall choose its deci-
sion variable (i.e., strategy) xi from its local decision set
Ωi ⊆ Rni . Let x = col((xi)i∈I) ∈ Ω denote the stacked
vector of all the agents’ decisions, Ω := ×i∈IΩi ⊆ Rn
the overall action space and n :=
∑N
i=1 ni. Moreover,
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let x−i = col((xj)j∈I\{i}) denote the collective strat-
egy of all the agents, except that of agent i. The goal
of each agent i ∈ I is to minimize its objective function
Ji(xi, x−i), which depends on both the local strategy xi
and on the decision variables of the other agents x−i.
Furthermore, we address generalized games, where the
coupling among the agents arises also via their feasible
decision sets. In particular, we consider affine coupling
constraints; thus the overall feasible set is
X := Ω ∩ {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b} , (1)
where A := [A1, . . . , AN ] and b :=
∑N
i=1 bi, with Ai ∈
Rm×ni and bi ∈ Rm being local data. The game then
is represented by N inter-dependent optimization prob-
lems:
∀i ∈ I :
{
argmin
yi∈Rni
Ji(yi, x−i)
s.t. (yi, x−i) ∈ X .
(2)
In this paper, we consider the problem to compute a
GNE, as formalized next.
Definition 1 A collective strategy x∗ = col((x∗i )i∈I) is
a generalized Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ I,
x∗i ∈ argmin
yi
Ji
(
yi, x
∗
−i
)
s.t. (yi, x
∗
−i) ∈ X . 
Next, we formulate standard convexity and regularity
assumptions for the constraint sets and cost functions.
Standing Assumption 1 For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is
non-empty, closed and convex; X is non-empty and sat-
isfies Slater’s constraint qualification; Ji is continuously
differentiable and the function Ji (·, x−i) is convex for
every x−i. 
Moreover, among all the possible GNE, we focus on the
important subclass of variational GNE (v-GNE) [12,
Def. 3.11]. Under the previous assumption, x∗ is a v-
GNE of the game in (2) if and only if there exist a dual
variable λ∗ ∈ Rm such that the following KKT condi-
tions are satisfied [12, Th. 4.8]:
0n ∈ F (x∗) +A>λ∗ + NΩ (x∗)
0m ∈ − (Ax∗ − b) + NmR≥0 (λ∗),
(3)
where F is the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
F (x) := col (∇xiJi(xi, x−i))i∈I . (4)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique v-
GNE is the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient
[13, Th. 2.3.3], as postulated next. This assumption was
used, e.g., in [17, Ass. 2], [4, Ass. 3], [8, Ass. 4].
Standing Assumption 2 The pseudo-gradient map-
ping F in (4) is µ-strongly monotone and θ0-Lipschitz
continuous, for some µ > 0, θ0 > 0. 
3 Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium
seeking
In this section,we consider the game in (2), where each
agent is associated with the following dynamical system:
∀i ∈ I : x˙i = ΠΩi (xi, ui) , xi(0) ∈ Ωi. (5)
Our aim is to design the inputs ui to seek a v-GNE
in a fully distributed way. Specifically, each agent only
knows its own cost function Ji and feasible set Ωi. Be-
sides, agent i does not have full knowledge of x−i, and
only relies on the information exchanged locally with
neighbors over a communication network G(I, E). The
unordered pair (i, j) belongs to the set of edges E if and
only if agent j and i can exchange information. We de-
note W = [wij ]i,j∈I ∈ RN×N the symmetric adjacency
matrix of G, with wij > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E , wij = 0 other-
wise; L the symmetric Laplacian matrix of G; Ni := {j |
(i, j) ∈ E} the set of neighbors of agent i
Standing Assumption 3 The communication graph
G(I, E) is undirected and connected. 
In the remainder of the section, we present two dynamic
controllers to asymptotically drive the system in (5) to-
wards a v-GNE, in a fully-distributed fashion.
3.1 Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking al-
gorithm with constant gain
Our first algorithm is the continuous-time counterpart
of [23, Alg. 1]. To cope with partial-decision information,
each agent keeps an estimate of all other agents’ action.
We denotexi = col((xij)j∈I) ∈ RNn, wherexii := xi and
xij is agent i’s estimate of agent j’s action, for all j 6= i.
Moreover, each agent keeps an estimate λi ∈ Rm≥0 of the
dual variable, and an auxiliary variable zi ∈ Rm to allow
for distributed consensus of the multipliers estimates.
Our proposed dynamics are summarized in Algorithm 1,
where c > 0 is a global constant parameter and the initial
conditions xi−i(0) ∈ Rn−ni , λi(0) ∈ Rm≥0, zi(0) ∈ Rm
can be chosen arbitrarily.
We note that the agents exchange {xi, zi, λi} with their
neighbors only, therefore the controller can be imple-
mented distributedly. In steady state, agents should
agree on their estimates, i.e., xi = xj , λi = λj , for
all i, j ∈ I. This motivates the presence of consensual
terms for both primal and dual variables. We denote
Eq := {y ∈ RNq : y = 1N ⊗ y, y ∈ Rq} the consensual
space of dimension q, for an integer q > 0, and E⊥q its
orthogonal complement. Specifically, En is the estimate
3
Algorithm 1 Distributed GNE seeking (constant gain)
For all i ∈ I:
x˙i = ΠΩi (xi, ui)
ui = −
(
∇xiJi(xi,xi−i) +A>i λi + c
∑
j∈Ni
wij(xi − xji )
)
x˙i−i = −c
∑
j∈Ni wij(x
i
−i − xj−i)
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
λ˙i = ΠRm≥0
(
λi, Aixi − bi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(zi − zj + λi − λj)
)
consensus subspace and Em is the multiplier consensus
subspace.
To write the closed-loop system in compact form, let us
define, as in [23, Eq. 13-14], for all i ∈ I,
Ri : =
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
]
, (6a)
Si : =
[
In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
, (6b)
where n<i :=
∑
j<i,j∈I nj , n>i :=
∑
j>i,j∈I nj . We
note that Ri selects the i-th ni dimensional compo-
nent from an n-dimensional vector, while Si removes
it. Thus, Rixi = xii = xi and Sixi = xi−i. We define
R := diag ((Ri)i∈I), S := diag
(
(Si)i∈I
)
. It follows that
x = Rx and col((xi−i)i∈I) = Sx ∈ R(N−1)n. Moreover,
we have that
R>R+ S>S = INn. (7)
Let λ := col((λi)i∈I), Λ := diag
(
(Ai)i∈I
)
, b :=
col((bi)i∈I), and, for any integer q > 0, Lq := L ⊗ Iq.
Furthermore, we define the extended pseudo-gradient
mapping F as:
F (x) := col
(∇xiJi (xi,xi−i)i∈I). (8)
Then, the closed-loop system, in compact form, reads as
x˙ = R>ΠΩ
(Rx,−(F (x) + Λ>λ+ cRLnx))
+ S> (−cSLnx) (9a)
z˙ = Lmλ (9b)
λ˙ = ΠRNm≥0 (λ, (ΛRx− b −Lmλ−Lmz)). (9c)
The following lemma relates the equilibria of the system
in (9) to the v-GNE of the game in (2). The proof is
analogous to [23, Th. 1], hence it is omitted.
Lemma 2 The following statements hold:
i) Any equilibrium point ω¯ = col
(
x¯, z¯, λ¯
)
of the dy-
namics in (9) is such that x¯ = 1N⊗x∗, λ¯ = 1N⊗λ∗,
where the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions
in (3), hence x∗ is the v-GNE of the game in (2).
ii) The set of equilibrium points of (9) is nonempty.

We remark that, in Algorithm 1, each agent evaluates
the gradient of its cost function in its local estimate, not
on the actual collective strategy. In fact, only when the
estimates belong to the consensus space, i.e., x = 1⊗ x
(in the case of full information, for example), we have
that F (x) = F (x). It follows that the operator R>F is
not necessarily monotone, not even if the pseudo gradi-
ent F in (4) is strongly monotone (Standing Assump-
tion 2). This is the main technical difficulty that arises
when studying NE seeking under partial-information. To
deal with this complication, cocoercivity of the extended
pseudo-gradient (on the augmented estimate space) is
sometimes postulated [30, Ass. 4], [27, Ass. 5]. However,
this is a limiting assumption, which does not hold in
general [23, Rem. 6]. Instead, our analysis is based on a
weaker restricted monotonicity property, which can be
guaranteed for any game satisfying Standing Assump-
tions 1-3, without additional hypotheses, as formalized
in the next two statements.
Lemma 3 The extended pseudo-gradient mapping F in
(8) is θ-Lipschitz continuous, for some µ ≤ θ ≤ θ0: for
any x,y ∈ RNn, ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ‖x− y‖. 
Proof. See Appendix A 
Lemma 4 ([23, Lem. 3]) Let
M1 :=
 µN − θ0+θ2√N
− θ0+θ
2
√
N
cλ2(L)− θ
, c := (θ0+θ)2+4µθ4µλ2(L) . (10)
For any c > c, for any x and any y ∈ En, it holds that
M1  0 and also that
(x− y)> (R> (F (x)− F (y)) + cLn (x− y))
≥ λmin(M1) ‖x− y‖2 . 
Remark 1 Lipschitz continuity of the extended-pseudo
gradient is often postulated, e.g. [23, Ass. 4], [8, Ass. 5].
Lemma 3 shows that this condition can be inferred by
Standing Assumptions 1-2, similarly to [29, Lem. 1].
The restricted strong monotonicity property of the pre-
vious statement is not new in the context of of games
played under partial-information, see, e.g., [23], [17], [26].
By leveraging Lemma 4, we next show the convergence
of the dynamics in (9) to a v-GNE. For brevity of nota-
tion, let us define, in the remainder of the paper, the set
Ω := {x ∈ RNn | Rx ∈ Ω}. (11)
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Theorem 1 Let c > c, with c as in (10). For any initial
condition in Ξ = Ω × RmN × RmN≥0 , the system in (9)
has a unique Carathodory solution, which belongs to Ξ
for all t ≥ 0. The solution converges to an equilibrium
col
(
x¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, where the
pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), hence
x∗ is the v-GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof. See Appendix E 
3.2 Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking al-
gorithm with adaptive gains
The dynamic controller proposed in the last subsection
allows to seek a v-GNE in a fully distributed way, pro-
vided that the global fixed gain c is chosen high-enough,
as in Theorem 1. However, selecting a gain that ensures
convergence requires global knowledge about the graph
G, i.e., the algebraic connectivity, and about the game
mapping, i.e., the strong monotonicity and Lipschitz
constants. These parameters are unlikely to be available
locally in a network system, when the cost function of
each agent is private. To overcome this limitation and
enhance the scalability of the design, the authors of [8]
proposed a controller for the integrator systems in (5),
where the gain is tuned online, thus relaxing the need
for global information, for games without coupling con-
straints. In this section we extend their result to the
GNE problem, i.e., to games with shared constraints.
Our proposed controller is given in Algorithm 2. For
all i ∈ I, ki is the adaptive gain of agent i, γi > 0 is
a constant local parameter, ρi = col((ρij)j∈I), and the
initial conditions xi−i(0) ∈ Rn−ni , ki(0) ∈ R, λi(0) ∈
Rm≥0, zi(0) ∈ Rm can be chosen arbitrarily. We can
Algorithm 2 Distributed GNE seeking (adaptive gains)
For all i ∈ I:
x˙i = ΠΩi (xi, ui)
ui = −∇xiJi(xi,xi−i)−A>i λi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(kjρ
j
i − kiρii)
x˙i−i = −
∑
j∈Ni wij(kjρ
j
−i − kiρi−i)
k˙i = γi‖ρi‖2, ρi =
∑
j∈Ni wij
(
xj − xi)
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij (λi − λj)
λ˙i = ΠRm≥0
(
λi, Aixi − bi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(zi − zj + λi − λj)
)
rewrite the overall closed-loop, in compact form, as
x˙ = R>ΠΩ
(Rx,− (F (x) + Λ>λ+R (LKL⊗ In)x))
+ S> (−S (LKL⊗ In)x) (12a)
k˙ = D (ρ)
>
(Γ⊗ In)ρ, ρ = −(L⊗ In)x (12b)
z˙ = Lmλ (12c)
λ˙ = ΠRNm≥0 (λ, (ΛRx− b −Lmλ−Lmz)). (12d)
where k := col (k1, . . . , kN ), ρ := col
(
ρ1, . . . , ρN
)
,
Γ := diag (γ1, . . . , γN ), K := diag (k1, . . . , kN ),
D(ρ) := diag
(
ρ1, . . . , ρN
)
.
Lemma 5 The following statements hold:
i) Any equilibrium point col
(
x¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
of (12) is such
that x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, where the pair
(x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), hence
x∗ is the v-GNE of the game in (2).
ii) The set of equilibrium points of (12) is nonempty.

Proof. See Appendix B 
The following result is analogous to Lemma 4. The proof
relies on the decomposition of x along the consensus
subspace En, where F is strongly monotone, and the
disagreement subspace E⊥n , where LKL⊗ In is strongly
monotone.
Lemma 6 Let
M2 :=
 µN − θ0+θ2√N
− θ0+θ
2
√
N
k∗λ2(L)2 − θ
, k := (θ0+θ)2+4µθ4µλ2(L)2 . (13)
For any k∗ > k and K∗ = INk∗, for any x ∈ RNn and
any y ∈ En, it holds that M2  0 and also that
(x− y)>R> (F (x)− F (y))
+ (LK∗L⊗ IM ) (x− y)) ≥ λmin(M2) ‖x− y‖2 . 
Proof. See Appendix C 
Building on this property, we can now present the main
result of this section.
Theorem 2 For any initial condition in Ξ = Ω×RN ×
RmN×RmN≥0 , the system in (12) has a unique Carathodory
solution, which belongs to Ξ for all t ≥ 0. The solution
converges to an equilibrium col
(
x¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with x¯ =
1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗ and the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies
the KKT conditions in (3), hence x∗ is the v-GNE of the
game in (2). 
5
Proof. See Appendix D 
Remark 2 Algorithm 2 allows for a fully uncoupled
tuning. Specifically, each agent i can choose locally the
initial conditions and the rate γi, independently of the
other agents and without any need for communication
or knowledge of global parameters. Compared to Algo-
rithm 1, the agents exchange some extra information,
namely the variables (kiρ
i)i∈I .
4 Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium
seeking for aggregative games
In this section, we focus on aggregative games. We as-
sume that ni = n¯ > 0 for all i ∈ I (hence n = Nn¯). In
(average) aggregative games, the cost function of each
agent depends on the local decision and on the value of
the average strategy, i.e., avg(x) := 1N
∑
i∈Ixi. It follows
that, for each i ∈ I, there is a function fi : Rn¯×Rn¯ → R
such that the original cost function Ji in (2) can be writ-
ten as
Ji(xi, x−i) =: fi(xi, avg(x)). (14)
Since an aggregative game is only a particular instance
of the game in (2), all the considerations on the existence
and uniqueness of a v-GNE and equivalence with the
KKT conditions in (3) are still valid.
Moreover, Algorithms 1-2 could still be used to drive a
system of single integrators (5) towards a v-GNE. This
would require each agent to keep (and exchange) an esti-
mate of all other agents’ action, i.e., a vector of (N−1)n¯
components. In practice, however, the cost of each agent
is only a function of the aggregative value avg(x), whose
dimension n¯ is independent of the number N of agents.
To reduce the communication and computation burden,
in this section, we introduce two distributed controllers,
that are scalable with the number of agents, specifically
designed to seek a v-GNE in aggregative games.
Our proposed dynamics are obtained by adapting Algo-
rithms 1, 2 to take into account the aggregative struc-
ture of the game, and are illustrated in Algorithms 3, 4,
respectively. Since the agents rely on local information
only, they don’t have access to the actual value of the
average strategy. Therefore, we embed each agent with
an auxiliary error variable ςi ∈ Rn¯, that is an estimate
of the quantity avg(x)− xi. Each agent aims at asymp-
totically reconstructing the true aggregate value, based
on the information received from its neighbors. We used
the notation
∇xifi(xi, σi) = ∇yfi(y, σi)|y=xi +
1
N
∇yfi(xi, y)|y=σi .
Algorithm 3 Distributed GNE seeking in aggregative
games (constant gain)
For all i ∈ I:
Initialize ςi = 0n¯;
x˙i = ΠΩi (xi, ui)
ui = −∇xifi(xi, σi)−A>i λi − c
∑
j∈Ni wij(σ
i − σj)
ς˙i = −c
∑
j∈Ni wij(σ
i − σj), σi = xi + ςi
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
λ˙i = ΠRm≥0
(
λi, Aixi − bi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(zi − zj + λi − λj)
)
Algorithm 4 Distributed GNE seeking in aggregative
games (adaptive gains)
For all i ∈ I:
Initialize ςi = 0n¯;
x˙i = ΠΩi (xi, ui)
ui = −∇xifi(xi, σi)−A>i λi −
∑
j∈Ni wij(kjρ
j − kiρi)
ς˙i = −
∑
j∈Ni wij(kjρ
j − kiρi) σi = xi + ςi
k˙i = γi‖ρi‖2 ρi =
∑
j∈Ni wij
(
σj − σi)
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
λ˙i = ΠRm≥0
(
λi, Aixi − bi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(zi − zj + λi − λj)
)
We note that, in Algorithms 3, 4, the agents send and
receive the quantities σi ∈ Rn¯, instead of exchanging the
variables xi ∈ RNn¯, like in Algorithms 1, 2.
Let ς := col((ςi)i∈I), σ := col((σi)i∈I). Furthermore,
let us define the extended pseudo-gradient mapping F˜ as
F˜ (x,σ) := col
( (∇xifi(xi, σi))i∈I ). (15)
Lemma 7 The mapping F˜ in (15) is θ˜-Lipschitz con-
tinuous, for some θ˜ > 0: for any (x,σ), (x′,σ′) ∈ R2n,
‖F˜ (x,σ)− F˜ (x′,σ′)‖ ≤ θ˜ ‖col(x− x′,σ − σ′)‖ . There-
fore, the mapping F˜ (x, ·) is θ˜σ-Lipschitz continuous, for
some 0 < θ˜σ ≤ θ˜, for all x ∈ Rn. 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3, by observing that
F˜ (x,σ) = F ((x, (IN ⊗1N−1⊗ In¯)( NN−1σ− 1N−1x))). 
We note that, in Algorithms 3, 4, each agent evaluates
the gradient of its cost function in its local estimate of
the average strategy. Only if all the estimates coincide
with the actual value, i.e., σ = 1N ⊗ avg(x), we can
conclude that F˜ (x,σ) = F (x), F as in (4).
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The dynamics in Algorithms 3, 4 can be rewritten in
compact form, as
x˙ = ΠΩ
(
x,−F˜ (x,σ)−Λ>λ− cLn¯σ
)
(16a)
ς˙ = −cLn¯(σ), σ = x+ ς (16b)
z˙ = Lmλ (16c)
λ˙ = ΠRNm≥0 (λ, (Λx− b−Lmλ−Lmz)) , (16d)
and
x˙ = ΠΩ
(
x,−F˜ (x,σ)−Λ>λ− (LKL⊗ In¯)σ
)
(17a)
ς˙ = −(LKL⊗ In¯)σ, σ = x+ ς (17b)
k˙ = D (ρ)
>
(Γ⊗ In¯)ρ, ρ = −(L⊗ In¯)σ (17c)
z˙ = Lmλ (17d)
λ˙ = ΠRNm≥0 (λ, (Λx− b−Lmλ−Lmz)) , (17e)
respectively.
The convergence analysis of the dynamics in (16), (17),
to a v-GNE makes use of an invariance property of the
systems, namely that avg(x) = avg(σ) along any tra-
jectory, if the initial conditions are chosen opportunely.
In fact, it is crucial to set ςi(0) = 0n¯, that ensures
avg(x(0)) = avg(σ(0)). Indeed, the dynamics in (16b)
or (17b) can be regarded as a continuous time dynamic
tracking [20] for the time-varying quantity avg(x) − x.
By leveraging this invariance property, we obtain a re-
finement of the restricted strong monotonicity proper-
ties in Lemmas 4, 6, as demonstrated next.
Lemma 8 ([16, Lemma 4]) Let
M3 :=
[
µ − θ˜σ2
− θ˜σ2 cλ2(L)
]
, c :=
θ˜2σ
4µλ2(L)
(18)
For any c > c, for any (x,σ) such that avg(x) = avg(σ)
and any (x′,σ′) such that σ′ = 1N ⊗ avg(x′), it holds
that M3  0, and also that
(x− x′)>(F˜ (x,σ)− F˜ (x′,σ′))
+(σ − σ′)>(cLn¯(σ − σ′))
≥ λmin(M3) ‖col (x− x′,σ − 1N ⊗ avg(x))‖2 . 
Lemma 9 Let
M4 =
[
µ − θ˜σ2
− θ˜σ2 k∗λ2(L)2
]
, k =
θ˜2σ
4µλ2(L)2
(19)
For any k∗ > k and K∗ = INK∗, for any (x,σ) such
that avg(x) = avg(σ) and any (x′,σ′) such that σ′ =
1N ⊗ avg(x′), it holds that M4  0, and also that
(x− x′)>(F˜ (x,σ)− F˜ (x′,σ′))
+(σ − σ′)>((LK∗L⊗ In¯)(σ − σ′))
≥ λmin(M4) ‖col (x− x′,σ − 1N ⊗ avg(x))‖2 . 
Proof. See Appendix F 
We are now ready to prove the main results of this sec-
tion.
Theorem 3 Let c > c, with c as in (18). For any initial
condition in Ξ = Ω×Rn×RmN ×RmN≥0 such that ς(0) =
0n, the system in (16) has a unique Carathodory solution
that belongs to Ξ for all t ≥ 0. The solution converges to
an equilibrium col(x¯, ς¯, z¯, λ¯), with x¯+ ς¯ = 1N ⊗ avg(x¯),
λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, where the pair (x¯, λ∗) satisfies the KKT
conditions in (3), hence x¯ is the v-GNE of the game in
(2). 
Proof. See Appendix H. 
Theorem 4 For any initial condition in Ξ = Ω×Rn ×
RN × RmN × RmN≥0 such that ς(0) = 0n, the system in
(17) has a unique Carathodory solution, which belongs to
Ξ for all t ≥ 0. The solution converges to an equilibrium
col
(
x¯, ς¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with x¯+ς¯ = 1N⊗avg(x¯), λ¯ = 1N⊗λ∗,
where the pair (x¯, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in
(3), hence x¯ is the v-GNE of the game in (2). 
Proof. See Appendix G 
5 Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium
seeking for multi-integrator systems
In this section, we consider a game as in (2) under the
following additional assumption, which, to the best of
our knowledge, has been always used in NE problems
in the presence of higher-order dynamical agents [24,
Ass. 1], [10, Def. 1].
Assumption 1 Ω = Rn. 
Besides, we assume that, for all i ∈ I, agent is modeled
as an integrator of order ri, ri > 1, i.e., of the form
x
(ri)
i = ui (single-integrators are not included for ease
of presentation). Equivalently, using a notation that will
be useful in the following (see [24]), we have
∀i ∈ I :
{
x˙i = Civi
v˙i = Eivi +Giui,
(20a)
(20b)
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where, for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ Rni , vi ∈ R(ri−1)ni ,
Ei =
[
0ni(ri−2)×ni Ini(ri−2)
0ni×ni 0ni×ni(ri−2)
]
, Gi =
[
0ni(ri−2)×ni
Ini
]
,
Ci =
[
Ini 0ni×ni(ri−2)
]
, vi = col
(
x
(1)
i , . . . , x
(ri−1)
i
)
.
Our aim is to drive the agents’ actions (i.e., the xi co-
ordinates of each agent state (xi, vi)) to a v-GNE of the
game in (2). Moreover, at steady state, the generalized
velocities vi of all the agents must be zero. We empha-
size that we are not able to directly control the agent
strategy xi for the system in (20).
We assume that each agent is able to measure its own
generalized velocity vi. As in [24], we consider the input
u = u˜i − [Ini c>i ⊗ Ini ]vi = u˜i −
ri−2∑
k=0
ci,kx
(k+1)
i , (21)
where c>i = [ci,1 . . . ci,(ri−2)] and (ci,0 =
1, ci,1, . . . , ci,(ri−2), ci,(ri−1) = 1) are the ascending co-
efficients of any Hurwitz polynomial of order (ri − 1).
Besides, we define, for all i ∈ I, the transformation
(xi, vi) 7→ (ζi, vi), where
ζi := xi + [ c>i ⊗ Ini Ini ]vi. (22)
Here, ζi can be interpreted as a prediction of the posi-
tion of agent i, given its current state. Each closed-loop
system, in the new coordinates, reads as
∀i ∈ I :
{
ζ˙i = u˜i
v˙i = E˜ivi +Giu˜i,
(23a)
(23b)
where
E˜i =
[
0ni(ri−2)×ni Ini(ri−2)
−Ini −c>i ⊗ Ini
]
.
We note that the dynamics of the new variable ζi in
(23a), under Assumption 1, are identical to the single-
integrator in (5), with translated input u˜i. As such, we
are in a position to design the inputs u˜i according to
Algorithm 2 (or 1, or 3 or 4 for aggregative games), to
drive the variable ζ := col((ζi)i∈I) to an equilibrium
ζ¯ = x∗, where x∗ is the v-GNE for the game in (2).
Moreover, we note that E˜i is a Hurwitz matrix, as it is
in canonical controllable form (modulo Kronecker mul-
tiplication by identity), and the coefficients of the last
row are by assumption the coefficients of an Hurwitz
polynomial. Therefore, the velocity dynamics (23b) are
Input-to-state-stable (ISS) with respect to the input ui
[19, Lemma 4.6]. Finally, we remark that, at any equi-
librium of (23), vi = 0ni(ri−1), hence ζi = xi, for all
i ∈ I. Building on this considerations, we propose Algo-
rithm 5 to drive the multi-integrator agents (20) towards
a v-GNE.
Algorithm 5 Distributed GNE seeking for multi-
integrator agents (adaptive gain)
For all i ∈ I:
x˙i = Civi
v˙i = Eivi +Giui
ui = u˜i − [Ini c>i ⊗ Ini ]vi
u˜i = −∇iJi(ζii , ζi−i)−A>i λi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(kjρ
j
i − kiρii)
ζ˙i−i = −
∑
j∈Ni wij(kjρ
j
−i − kiρi−i)
ζii = xi + [ c
>
i ⊗ Ini Ini ]vi
k˙i = γi‖ρi‖2 ρi =
∑
j∈Ni wij
(
ζj − ζi)
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij (λi − λj)
λ˙i = ΠRm≥0
(
λi, Aiζ
i
i − bi −
∑
j∈Ni
wij(zi − zj + λi − λj)
)
Differently from Algorithm 2, the agents are not
keeping an estimate of other agents action, but of
other agents prediction. Here, ζi = (col(ζij)j∈I), and
ζij represents agent i’s estimation of the quantity
ζj for j 6= i, while ζii = ζi. By defining C =
diag((Ci)i∈I), E˜ = diag((E˜)i∈I), G = diag((Gi)i∈I),
B = diag(([ c>i ⊗ Ini Ini ])i∈I), we can rewrite the
closed-loop system in compact form as
x˙ = Cv (24a)
v˙ = E˜v −G(F (ζ) + Λ>λ+R (LKL⊗ In) ζ) (24b)
Sζ˙ = −S (LKL⊗ In) ζ, Rζ = x+Bv (24c)
k˙ = D (ρ)
>
(Γ⊗ In)ρ, ρ = −(L⊗ In)ζ (24d)
z˙ = Lmλ (24e)
λ˙ = ΠRNm≥0 (λ, (ΛRζ − b −Lmλ−Lmz)) (24f)
Theorem 5 Let Assumption 1 hold. For any initial
condition with λ(0) ∈ Rm≥0, the system in (24) has a
unique Carathodory solution, such that λ(t) ∈ RNm≥0 ,
for every t ≥ 0. The solution converges to an equi-
librium col
(
x¯, v¯, ζ¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with x¯ = x∗, v¯ = 0r and
r =
∑
i∈I(ri−1)ni, ζ¯ = 1N⊗x∗, λ¯ = 1N⊗λ∗, where the
pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), hence
x∗ is the v-GNE for the game in (2). 
Proof. See Appendix I 
Remark 3 To deal with single integrator agents, i.e.,
if ri = 1 for some i ∈ I, it is enough to negect vi in
Algorithm 5, i.e., x˙i = ui = u˜i, ζ
i
i = xi essentially, we
retrieve the controller in Algorithm 2. 
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Algorithm 5 can be tuned in a fully decentralized way
and without the need for any global information. We re-
mark that Algorithm 5 is derived by generating u˜i in
(23) according to Algorithm 2. However, the proof of
Theorem 5 is not based on the specific structure of Algo-
rithm 2, but only on its convergence properties. Hence
the result still holds if another controller with similar
features is employed in place of Algorithm 2, allowing
to select the one that best suits the problem at hand.
For example, by picking u˜i according to Algorithm 4, we
obtain a controller to drive a group of multi-integrator
agents toward a v-GNE of an aggregative game, that
can be tuned in a fully-uncoupled manner; by exploit-
ing the controller in [11, Eq. 11], we could address ag-
gregative games with equality constraints played over
balanced digraphs. In [24], the authors considered NE
problems (without shared constraints) and chose the in-
puts u˜i based on the algorithm presented in [17, Eq. 47]
(we retrieve this controller when considering Algorithm 1
in the absence of coupling constraints). The controller
in [17] achieves exponential convergence to a NE, hence
ISS with respect to possible additive disturbances [19,
Lemma 4.6]. Therefore, in [24], the authors were able to
handle the presence of deterministic disturbances, via an
asymptotic observer and by leveraging ISS arguments.
We have not guaranteed this robustness, i.e., exponential
convergence, for the primal-dual dynamics in (9). How-
ever, the controller in [24] is designed for games with-
out any local or shared constraints (in this case, the NE
problem reduces to finding a zero of the game mapping).
On the contrary, the controller in Algorithm 5 drives
the system in (20) to a v-GNE of a generalized game,
and ensures for the coupling constraints to be satisfied
asymptotically. We also remark that, like in [24], we as-
sume the absence of constraints on the local feasible set
of each agent (Assumption 1). Nevertheless, if some are
present, they can be dualized as the coupling constraints,
and hence satisfied asymptotically.
6 Illustrative applications
6.1 Mobile sensor network
We consider a group of five robots moving in a plane as
in [24]. Each agent i ∈ I = {1, . . . , 5} has a cost func-
tion Ji (pi, p−i) := pTi pi+d
>
i pi+
∑
j∈I ‖pi − pj‖2 , with
pi = col(xi, yi) its cartesian coordinates, di ∈ R2 ran-
dom local parameters. We impose the local constraints
0.1 ≤ yi ≤ 0.5, ∀i ∈ I. The robots can communicate
over a random undirected connected graph G(I, E). In
order for all the robots to maintain communication with
their neighbors, we impose the Chebyschev distance be-
tween any two neighboring robots to be smaller than 0.2.
Hence, the (affine) coupling constraints are represented
by max{|xi − xj |, |yi − yj |} ≤ 0.2,∀(i, j) ∈ E . We con-
sider both velocity-actuated and force-actuated robots.
We set c = 30 to satisfy the condition in Theorem 1;
γi = 1,∀i ∈ I; initial conditions are chosen randomly.
Velocity-actuated robots: Each agent has a dynamic as in
(5). Figure 1 compares the results for Algorithms 1 and 2
and shows convergence of both to the unique v-GNE and
asymptotic satisfaction of the coupling constraints.
Force-actuated robots: Each agent is modeled as a
double-integrator, i.e., as in (20) with ri = 2. The lo-
cal constraints are considered as part of the coupling
constraints, hence they are dualized and satisfied only
asymptotically (see 5). We simulate Algorithm 5 and
the analogous algorithm with constant gain (obtained
by choosing u˜i in (23a) according to Algorithm 1). The
results are illustrated in Figure 2. Finally, in Figure 3,
we compare the trajectories of the five robots in the
velocity- and force-actuated scenario, under adaptive
gain algorithms. In both cases, the agent are converging
to the unique v-GNE. However, the local constraints are
satisfied along the whole trajectory for single-integrator
agents, only asymptotically for the double-integrator
agents.
6.2 Resource allocation
We consider a resource allocation problem, modeled as
an aggregative game [3]. Each of N agents has to com-
plete a task in n¯ time slots. We denote xi(h) ∈ [0, 1],
the ratio of the task that agent i allocates at time slot
h, h = 1, . . . , n¯. The local feasible sets are given by
Ωi := {xi ∈ Rn¯|0n ≤ xi ≤ ui,1>n¯ xi = 1}, i ∈ I,
where ui is the vector of maximum task allocations
of agent i. The agents share the coupling constraints∑N
i=1 xi(h) := Ax ≤ b(h), h = 1, . . . , n¯, represent-
ing the maximal collective weighted allocation possi-
ble per time slot. The objective of agent i is to fol-
low as much as possible an ideal strategy x¯i, while
avoiding to allocate its task in time slots congested by
other agents. This is represented by the cost function
Ji(xi, avg(x)) :=
1
2ai‖xi − x¯i‖2 + x>i Qi avg(x), where
ai > 0 andQi  0. In our simulations, we randomly gen-
erate the parameters as N = 5, n¯ = 5, ai ∼ [1, 2], Qi to
ensure Standing Assumption 2. To ensure feasibility, we
set ui =
2
n¯1n¯ and b =
1
2Au, bi =
b
N , i ∈ I. We assume
that x¯i = col(1, 0, . . . , 0), i ∈ I, i.e., each agent has an
incentive to complete its task in the first time slot. Fig-
ure 4 shows a comparison between Algorithm 3 and 4,
assuming single integrator dynamics (5) for the agents,
randomly generated initial conditions and communica-
tion graph, c = 25 to satisfy the condition in Theorem
3 and γi = 1 for all i ∈ I.
7 Conclusion and outlook
Generalized games played by multi-integrator systems
can be solved via continuous-time fully-distributed
primal-dual pseudogradient controllers, provided that
the game mapping is strongly monotone and Lipschitz
continuous. Convergence can be ensured even without
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Fig. 1. Results of Algorithms 1- 2 for velocity-actuated
robots.
a-priori knowledge on the game parameters, via inte-
gral consensus. Seeking an equilibrium when the agents
are characterized by constrained dynamics is currently
an unexplored problem. The extension of our results to
networks of heterogeneous dynamical systems is left as
future research.
8 Appendices
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 3
Let us define x = col((xi)i∈I), y = col((yi)i∈I). By
Standing Assumption 2, we have, for all i ∈ I,
‖∇iJi(xi)−∇iJi(yi)‖ ≤ ‖F (xi)−F (yi)‖ ≤ θ0‖xi−yi‖.
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Fig. 2. Results of Algorithm 5 for force-actuated robots.
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Fig. 3. Velocity- and force-actuated robots trajectories, with
adaptive gains.
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Fig. 4. Results of Algorithms 3-4, for single-integrator agents.
Hence
‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 = ∑i∈I ‖∇iJi(xi)−∇iJi(yi)‖2
≤ θ20
∑
i∈I ‖xi − yi‖2 = θ20‖x− y‖2.
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Then θ ≥ µ follows by choosing Sx = Sy, x 6= y. 
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 5
We follow the arguments of [23, Th. 1]. We first notice
that, under Standing Assumption 3, we have, for any
q > 0,
Range (L⊗ Iq) = Null
(
1>N ⊗ Iq
)
= E⊥q , (25)
Null (L⊗ Iq) = Range (1N ⊗ Iq) = Eq. (26)
i) For any equilibrium col(x¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯) of (12), we have:
0Nn ∈ R>F (x¯) +R>Λ>λ¯+
(
LK¯L⊗ In
)
x¯
+R>NΩ (Rx¯) (27)
0N = D (ρ¯)
>
(Γ⊗ In) ρ¯, ρ¯ = −(L⊗ In)x¯ (28)
0Nm = −Lmλ¯ (29)
0Nm ∈ −ΛRx¯+ b+Lm(λ¯+ z¯) + NRNm≥0
(
λ¯
)
, (30)
where K¯ = diag
(
k¯1, . . . , k¯N
)
, and we have used (7).
By (28) we have ρ¯ = 0Nn, i.e., x¯ ∈ En by (26),
and by (29) and (26), we have λ¯ ∈ Em. Therefore
x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗ and λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, for some x∗ ∈ Rn and
λ∗ ∈ Rm. By premultiplying (27) by (1>N ⊗ In), by (26)
and since (1>N ⊗ In)R> = In, F (1N ⊗ x∗) = F (x∗),
Rx¯ = x∗, and Λ>(1N ⊗ λ∗) = A>λ∗, we retrieve the
first KKT condition in (3). We obtain the second
condition in (3) by premultiplying (30) by (1>N ⊗ Im)
and using that (1>N ⊗ Im)b = b, (1>N ⊗ Im)Lm = 0
by (26) and symmetry of L, (1>N ⊗ Im)Λ = A and
(1>N ⊗ Im)NRNm≥0 (1N ⊗ λ
∗) = NNRm≥0(λ
∗) = NRm≥0(λ
∗).
ii) Let (x∗, λ∗) be any pair that satisfies the KKT con-
ditions in (3). By taking x¯ = 1N ⊗x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗λ∗ and
any k¯, (27)-(29) are satisfied as above. It suffices to show
that there exists z¯ such that (30) is satisfied, or equiva-
lently that (−ΛRx¯+ b+ Lmλ¯+ v¯) ∈ Range (Lm), for
some v¯ ∈ NRNm≥0
(
λ¯
)
. By (3), there exists v∗ ∈ NRm≥0(λ∗)
such that Ax∗ − b − v∗ = 0n. Since λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗,
NRNm≥0 (λ¯) = ×i∈INRm≥0(λ
∗), and it follows by prop-
erties of cones that col (v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
N ) ∈ NRNm≥0 (λ¯)
with v∗1 = · · · = v∗N = 1N v∗. Therefore
(1>N ⊗ Im)
(−ΛRx¯+ b+Lmλ¯+ col (v∗1 , . . . , v∗N )) =
b − Ax∗ + v∗ = 0m, and the conclusion follows since
Null
(
1>N ⊗ Im
)
= Range (Lm) by (25). 
Appendix C Proof of Lemma 6
Let y = 1n ⊗ y, for some y ∈ Rn. We decompose x =
x⊥+x‖, where x‖ and x⊥ are the projection of x on the
consensus subspace En and on the orthogonal subspace
E⊥n , respectively. Therefore x
‖ = 1N ⊗ xˆ, for some xˆ ∈
Rn. By [23, Eq. 50],
(x− y)>R>(F (x)− F (y)) ≥ −θ‖xˆ− y‖‖x⊥‖
+ µ‖xˆ− y‖2 − θ‖x⊥‖2 − θ0‖x⊥‖‖xˆ− y‖.
For any k∗ > k > 0, we have K∗  0 and, by (26),
Null (LK∗L⊗ In) = En. Therefore it holds that
(x− x′)> (LK∗L⊗ In) (x− x′) ≥ −k∗λ2(L)2‖x⊥‖2.
By ‖xˆ− x′‖ = 1√
N
∥∥x‖ − y∥∥, we conclude that
(x− y)> (R> (F (x)− F (y)) + (LK∗L⊗ In) (x− y))
≥
[
‖x⊥‖
‖x‖ − y‖
]>
M2
[
‖x⊥‖
‖x‖ − y‖
]
,
withM2 as in (13) and, for k
∗ > k,M2  0 by Silvester’s
criterion. The conclusion follows since, by orthogonality,
‖x‖ − y‖2 + ‖x⊥‖2 = ‖x− y‖2. 
Appendix D Proof of Theorem 2
We first rewrite the dynamics in (12) as
ω˙ = ΠΞ(ω,−B(ω)− Φω), (31)
where ω := col (x,k, z,λ),
B(ω) =
[R>F (x)+(LKL⊗In)x
−D(ρ)>(Γ⊗In)ρ
0Nm
Lmλ+b
]
,Φ =
[
0 0 0 R>Λ>
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −Lm
−ΛR 0 Lm 0
]
.
Let us define the quadratic Lyapunov function
V = 12‖ω − ω¯‖2Q
= 12 (‖x− x¯‖2 + ‖k − k¯‖2Γ−1 + ‖z − z¯‖2 + ‖λ− λ¯‖2),
whereQ =: diag(INn,Γ
−1, INm, INm) and x¯ = 1N⊗x∗,
λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, where the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT
conditions in (3), k¯ such that k∗ := min(k¯) ≥ k, with
k as in (13), z¯ chosen such that ω¯ := col
(
x¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
is an equilibrium for (12), and such a z¯ exists by the
proof of Lemma 5. We notice that Qω¯ is an equilibrium
of (31) if ω¯ is, and Qω ∈ Ξ if ω ∈ Ξ, because of the
specific structure of the matrix Q, of the set Ξ and of
the dynamics in (31). Therefore, we can apply Lemma 1
to obtain
V˙ (ω) : = ∇V (ω)ω˙ = (ω − ω¯)>Qω˙ =
= (ω − ω¯)>QΠΞ(ω,−B(ω)− Φω)
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≤ (ω − ω¯)>Q(−B(ω)− Φω). (32)
We remark that the inequality above has to be intended
to hold point-wise, since we still have to prove the ex-
istence of a solution to (31). By Lemma 1, it also holds
that (ω− ω¯)>Q(−B(ω¯)−Φω¯) ≤ 0. By subtracting this
term from (32), we obtain
V˙ (ω) ≤ −(ω − ω¯)>Q (B(ω)− B(ω¯) + Φ(ω − ω¯))
= −(x− x¯)>R> (F (x)− F (x¯))
− (x− x¯)> (LKL⊗ In) (x− x¯)
+ (k − k¯)>Γ−1D(ρ)> (Γ⊗ In)ρ
− (λ− λ¯)>Lm(λ− λ¯),
(33)
where, in the last equality, we used that QΦ = Φ, Φ> =
−Φ, and ρ¯ := −Lnx¯ = 0. The third addend in (33) can
be rewritten as
(k − k¯)>Γ−1D(ρ)> (Γ⊗ In)ρ =
∑N
i=1
(
ki − k¯i
)
ρi>ρi
= ρ>
((
K − K¯)⊗ In)ρ = x> (L (K − K¯)L⊗ In)x
= (x− x¯)> (L (K − K¯)L⊗ In) (x− x¯),
where K¯ := diag(k¯). Therefore the sum of the second
and third term in (33) is −(x − x¯)> (LK¯L⊗ In) (x −
x¯) ≤ −(x − x¯)> (LK∗L⊗ In) (x − x¯), where K∗ :=
k∗In. For the last addend in (33), we can write (λ −
λ¯)>Lm(λ−λ¯) = λ>Lmλ by (26) and, by [1, Th. 18.15],
λ>Lmλ ≥ 12λmax(L)‖Lmλ‖2. By Lemma 6, we finally get
V˙ ≤ −λmin(M1)‖x− x¯‖2 − 12λmax(L)‖Lmλ‖2, (34)
with M2  0 as in Lemma 6.
Let P be any compact sublevel set of V (notice that
V is radially unbounded) containing the initial condi-
tion ω(0) ∈ Ξ. P is invariant for the dynamics, since
V˙ (ω) ≤ 0 by (34). The set P ∩ Ξ is compact and con-
vex, therefore, by continuity, B + Φ is Lipschitz contin-
uous on it. We conclude that, for any initial condition,
there exists a unique Carathodory solution to (9), that
belongs to P ∩ Ξ (and therefore is bounded) for every t
[22, Th. 2.5]. Moreover, by [8, Th. 2], the solution con-
verges to the largest invariant set O contained in the set
Z := {ω s.t. V˙ (ω) = 0}.
We can already conclude boundedness of the trajectories
of (31) and that x converges to the point 1N ⊗ x∗, with
x∗ the unique v-GNE of the game in (2). We will now
show convergence of the other variables.
We first characterize the points col(xˆ, kˆ, zˆ, λˆ) ∈ Z, for
which the quantities in (32)-(34) must be zero. By (34),
xˆ = x¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, and λˆ ∈ Em, i.e. λˆ = 1N ⊗ λˆ, for
some λˆ ∈ Rm≥0. Also, by expanding (32), and, by using
that xˆ = x¯, ρˆ := −Lnxˆ, and by (26), we have
0 = (λˆ− λ¯)>(ΛRx¯− b−Lmzˆ) = (λˆ− λ∗)>(Ax∗ − b)
= λˆ>(Ax∗ − b) = λˆ>(ΛRx¯− b−Lm(λˆ+ zˆ)), (35)
where in the second equality we have again used (26)
and the third equality follows from the KKT conditions
in (3). This concludes the characterization of the set Z.
Then, let ω(t) = col(x(t),k(t), z(t),λ(t)) be the tra-
jectory starting at any col(x,k, z,λ) ∈ O. By invari-
ance of O, ω(t) must lie in Z ⊇ O for all t ≥ 0.
Hence, x(t) ≡ x¯. Therefore, by (12b), k˙(t) = 0 for all
t, or k(t) ≡ k. Since λ(t) ∈ Em for all t, z˙(t) = 0,
for all t, by (12c), or z(t) ≡ z. Hence the quantity
v := (ΛRx(t)− b−Lmλ(t)−Lmz(t)) is a constant
along the trajectory ω. Suppose by contradiction that
vk > 0, where vk denotes the k-th component of v. Then,
by (12d) and properties of the normal cone, λ˙(t)k = vk
for all t, and λ(t) grows indefinitely. Since all the solu-
tions of (12) are bounded, this is a contradiction. There-
fore, v ≤ 0, and λ(t)>v = 0 by (35). Equivalently,
v ∈ NRNm≥0 (λ(t)), hence λ˙(t) = 0, for all t. We conclude
that all the points in the set O are equilibria.
The set Λ(ω0) of ω-limit points
1 of the solution to (12)
starting from any ω0 ∈ Ξ is nonempty (by Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem, since all the trajectories of (12) are
bounded) and invariant (as in proof of [8, Lemma 5]).
By V˙ ≤ 0 it follows that V must be constant on Λ(ω0),
hence Λ(ω0) ⊆ Z (see proof of [8, Th.2]). Also Λ(ω0) is
invariant, so Λ(ω0) ⊆ O.
We want now to show that, for any for any ω0 ∈ Ξ,
Λ(ω0) is a singleton. If Λ(ω0) is a singleton, the solu-
tion converges to that point [1, Lemma 1.14], which is an
equilibrium, since Λ(ω0) ⊆ O. For the sake of contradic-
tion, we assume that there are two ω-limit points ω1 =
col (x¯,k, z1,λ1) ∈ Λ(ω0), ω2 = col (x¯2,k, z2,λ2) ∈
Λ(ω0), withω1 6= ω2. We note thatω1 andω2 must have
the same vector of adaptive gains k by definition of ω-
limit point, since the ki in Algorithm 2 are nonincreasing.
Let us define ω3 = col (x¯,k + 1α,z1,λ1), α ∈ R chosen
such that min(k + 1α) > k, k as in (13). By (34), the
quantity ‖ω(t) − ω3‖Q is nonincreasing along any tra-
jectory ω(t) of (31). Therefore, by definition of ω-limit
point, it must hold that ‖ω1 − ω3‖Q = ‖ω2 − ω3‖Q, or
‖ col(0Nn, α1N ,0Nm,0Nm)‖Q = ‖ col(0Nn, α1N ,λ1 −
λ2, z2 − z1)‖Q. Equivalently, ω1 = ω2, that is a contra-
diction. 
1 z : [0,∞) → Rn has an ω-limit point at z¯ if there exists a
nonnegative diverging sequence {tk}k∈N such that z (tk) → z¯
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Appendix E Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 and
hence it is only sketched here. Consider the Lyapunov
function V = 12‖ω − ω¯‖2, where ω = col (x, z,λ), and
ω¯ = col
(
x¯, z¯, λ¯
)
is any equilibrium point of (9). By
proceeding like in the proof of Theorem 2 and by defining
Φ =
[
0 0 R>Λ>
0 0 −Lm
−ΛR Lm 0
]
, B(ω) =
[
R>F (x)+cLnx
0Nm
Lmλ+b
]
,
we leverage Lemma 4 to obtain
V˙ (ω) ≤− λmin(M1)‖x− x¯‖2 − 12λmax(L)‖Lmλ‖2 (36)
with M1 as in Lemma 4. As in Theorem 2, we can show
the convergence to the set O of equilibria and that the
ω-limit set Λ(ω0) ⊆ O and it is nonempty, for any ω0.
Finally, since the distance to any equilibrium point along
any trajectory of (9) is non-increasing by (36), and since
the solution of (12) has an ω-limit point at an equilib-
rium, it follows that the solution converges to that equi-
librium. The last claim follows by Lemma 2. 
Appendix F Proof of Lemma 9
By Standing Assumption 2 and Lemma 7, we have
(x− x′)>(F˜ (x,σ)− F˜ (x′,1N ⊗ avg(x′)))
= (x− x′)>(F˜ (x,σ)− F˜ (x,1N ⊗ avg(x))
F˜ (x,1N ⊗ avg(x)− F˜ (x′,1N ⊗ avg(x′)
)
≥ µ‖x− x′‖2 − θ˜σ‖x− x′‖‖σ − 1N ⊗ avg(x)‖.
Moreover, we note that (σ − 1N ⊗ avg(x)) ∈ E⊥n¯ , since
avg(σ) = avg(x), and σ′ ∈ En¯. Hence, by (26), we have
(σ − σ′)>(LKL⊗ In¯)(σ − σ′)
≥ k∗λ2(L)2‖σ − 1N ⊗ avg(x)‖2,
and the conclusion follows readily. 
Appendix G Proof of Theorem 4
Let ω = col (x, ς,k, z,λ), Ψ := {ω ∈ Ξ | avg(ς) = 0n¯}.
First, we show that the set Ψ is invariant for the system
in (17). It is enough to note that, for all ω ∈ Ξ,
∇ω(avg(ς))>ω˙ = − 1
N
(1>N ⊗ In¯)(LKL⊗ In¯)σ = 0n¯.
Next, analogously to the proof of Lemma 5, it
can be shown that any equilibrium point ω¯ :=
col
(
x¯, ς¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
) ∈ Ψ of (17) is such that λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗,
the pair (x¯, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), and
σ¯ := x¯+ ς¯ = 1⊗avg(x¯). Moreover, for any pair (x∗, λ∗)
satisfying the KKT conditions in (3), there exists z¯ ∈
RmN such that col(x∗,1N⊗avg(x∗)−x∗,k, z¯,1N⊗λ∗) ∈
Ψ is an equilibrium for (17), for any k ∈ RN . There-
fore, the set of equilibria in Ψ is nonempty. The proof is
omitted because of space limitations.
Let ω¯ = col
(
x¯, ς¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
) ∈ Ψ be an equilibrium of (17)
such that k∗ = min(k¯) > k, k as in (19), and consider
the quadratic Lyapunov function V = 12‖ω−ω¯‖2Q, where
Q = diag(In, In,Γ
−1, INm, INm). By proceeding like in
the proof of Theorem 2 and by defining
B(ω) =
 F˜ (x,σ)+(LKL⊗In¯)σ(LKL⊗In¯)σ−D(ρ)>(Γ⊗In¯)ρ
0Nm
Lmλ+b
, Φ =[ 0 0 0 0 Λ>0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −Lm
−Λ 0 0 Lm 0
]
,
we obtain, by Lemma 9, that for all ω ∈ Ψ,
V˙ (ω) ≤ −λmin(M4)(‖x− x¯‖2 + ‖σ − 1N ⊗ x‖2)
− 12λmax(L)‖Lmλ‖2,
with M4  0 as in (19).
Let P = P¯ ∩Ψ, where P¯ is any compact sublevel set of
V containing the initial condition. Since ς(0) = 0n, we
have that ω(0) ∈ P. P is compact, convex and invariant.
Then, the existence of a unique solution of the system
in (17) and convergence to an equilibrium point in P
(hence, in Ψ) follows as for Theorem 2. 
Appendix H Proof of Theorem 3
The proof follows as for Theorem 4, by defining V =
1
2‖ω − ω¯‖2, where ω¯ := col
(
x¯, ς¯, z¯, λ¯
) ∈ Ψ is any equi-
librium of (16) and it can be shown that such an equi-
librium exists,
B(ω) :=
[
F˜ (x,σ)+cLn¯σ
cLn¯σ
0Nm
Lmλ+b
]
, Φ :=
[
0 0 0 Λ>
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −Lm
−Λ 0 Lm 0
]
,
and by exploiting Lemma 8.
Appendix I Proof of Theorem 5
By applying the transformation x 7→ Rζ = x + Bv to
the system in (24), we obtain:
v˙ = E˜v −G(F (ζ) + Λ>λ+R (LKL⊗ In) ζ) (37a)
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ζ˙ = −R>(F (ζ) + Λ>λ+R (LKL⊗ In) ζ)
− S>S (LKL⊗ In) ζ (37b)
k˙ = D (ρ)
>
(Γ⊗ In)ρ, ρ = −(L⊗ In)ζ (37c)
z˙ = Lmλ (37d)
λ˙ = ΠRNm≥0 (λ, (ΛRζ − b −Lmλ−Lmz)). (37e)
The system (37) is in cascade form for (37a) with re-
spect to (37b)-(37e). We note also that, under Assump-
tion 1, the subsystem (37b)-(37e) is exactly (9). Hence,
, by Theorem 2, there exists a unique solution to (37b)-
(37e), that is bounded and converges to an equilibrium
point col
(
ζ¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with ζ¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗,
where the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies KKT conditions in (3).
On the other hand, the dynamics in (37a) are ISS
with respect to the input u˜ := −(F (ζ) + Λ>λ +
R (LKL⊗ In) ζ) [19, Lemma 4.6], and this input is
bounded, by boundedness of the trajectory (ζ,k, z,λ)
and Lipschitz continuity in Lemma 3. Moreover, since
ζ¯ = 1N⊗x∗, λ¯ = 1N⊗λ∗, by the KKT conditions in (3)
and by continuity, we have u˜ → 0n for t → ∞. There-
fore, v(t) → 0r for t → ∞ (this follows from definition
of ISS, see [19, Ex. 4.58]). By definition of ζi = Riζi in
(22), it also follows that x→ x∗. 
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